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McNally v. United States: The Demise of the
Intangible Rights Doctrine
Fraud is "as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity."' The
truth in this maxim is borne out by the federal courts' acceptance-for over a
century-of the federal mail fraud statute, section 1341 of Title 18,2 as a means
of convicting individuals for a broad assortment of fraudulent acts. 3 In particular, the statute's prohibition of the use of the mails to execute "any scheme or
artifice to defraud ' 4 has been construed by many courts to embrace schemes
depriving the public of its "intangible rights" to honest government. 5 In Mc1. Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976); see infra note 4.
3. See United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1975) (secret payments to corporate
purchasing agent); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941) (bribery of public officials); Horman v. United States, 239 F. 350 (6th Cir.) (mailing of extortion notes), cert. denied, 187
U.S. 641 (1902); United States v. Classic, 35 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. La. 1940) (ballot tampering). The
mail fraud statute also provides an additional "weapon" in areas prior to or in the presence of special
legislation. See, eg., United States v. Green, 494 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1974) (mail fraud statute applies
to credit card fraud notwithstanding Truth in Lending Act); Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621
(5th Cir. 1969) (indictment of defendant under Securities Act of 1933 and § 1341), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 976 (1970); Porter v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (defendant convicted for
both mail fraud and securities violations based on the same conduct); Coffey & Welch, Federal
Regulation of Land Sales: Full Disclosure Comes Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. REs. 5, 11 (1969)
(abuses in interstate sales of realty); Givens, Roadblocks to Remedy in Consumer FraudLitigation,
24 CASE W. REs. 144, 145 (1972) (criminal fraud against consumers); Lynch, ProsecutingLoan

Sharks Under the Mail Fraud Statute, 14 FORDHAM L. REv. 150, 151-152 (1945) (loansharking
operations by organized crime); Mathews, CriminalProsecutions Under the FederalSecurities Laws
and RelatedStatutes: The Nature andDevelopment ofSEC CriminalCases, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
901, 911 (1971) (securities frauds).
4. Section 1341 reads in part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises,. . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do,
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any
such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it
is addressed, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
5. See United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 309-10 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Silvano,
812 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962, 964-965 (7th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1085 (1984); United
States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 122 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United
States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 414 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 100506 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1359-60
(4th Cir. 1979), aff'd in relevantpart, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 546 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 976
(1976); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974);
United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764-65 (8th Cir. 1973). In each case mailings were made in
connection with the scheme, which brought the acts within the scope of the mail fraud statute.
However, because the state was not "defrauded" of anything having economic value, the convictions
were based on the resultant deprivation of the citizenry's intangible right to honest government.
For a discussion of the development of the intangible rights doctrine, see Rakoff, The Federal
Mail FraudStatute (PartI), 18 DUQ. L. REv. 771, 795-821 (1980); Note, A Survey of the Mail Fraud
Act, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 673, 679-80 (1978); Comment, The Intangible-RightsDoctrine and Political-CorruptionProsecutionsUnder the FederalMail FraudStatute, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 562, 578-80
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Nally v. United States,6 however, the United States Supreme Court rejected this
longstanding construction of the mail fraud statute and read the statute as "limited in scope to the protection of property rights."'7 Although the Court for the
first time directly addressed the scope of section 1341 and its admittedly ambiguous and all-encompassing phraseology, the Court's decision-a restrictive construction of the language in the statute-is unsatisfactory. This Note examines
McNally in light of the legislative history of the mail fraud statute, past judicial
application of the statute, and the probable impact of the McNally holding. The
Note concludes that the McNally decision represents an unwarranted departure
from a history of United States Courts of Appeals decisions that affirmed convictions under the statute for violation of the public's intangible rights to good and
impartial government.
In 1974 Howard P. "Sonny" Hunt became Kentucky Democratic Party
Chairman and had de facto control over the purchasing of the State's insurance
policies.8 Since 1971 the State purchased worker's compensation insurance
through Wombwell Insurance Company (Wombwell) and, according to an
agreement between the company's vice president and certain political leaders,
Wombwell paid a percentage of the commissions it received to other insurance
agents designated by the politicians. 9 In 1975 Hunt assured Wombwell that it
could retain the worker's compensation insurance policy. In return, Wombwell
agreed to share any commissions over $50,000 a year with other insurance agencies selected by Hunt. 10 From 1975 to 1979, Wombwell distributed $851,000 in
commissions to twenty-one agencies including $200,000 to Seton Investments,
Inc., (Seton) a company controlled by Hunt and defendant James E. Gray, and
formed by them solely for the purpose of receiving the commissions. 1 Gray
also served as Secretary of Public Protection and Regulation, and later as Secretary of the governor's cabinet between 1976 and 1979.12 In late 1977 or 1978
defendant Charles J. McNally became associated with Seton and received
$77,500 in return for acting as Seton's frontman.1 3 Although McNally never
held a public office, he was an avid political supporter of the Kentucky governor.
(1980) [hereinafter Intangible-RightsDoctrine]; Comment, Survey ofthe Law ofMail Fraud, 1975 U.
ILL. L.F. 237, 246-48 [hereinafter Survey].
6. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987). The Supreme Court heard McNally with Gray v. United States,
also on certiorari to the Court. Both defendants appealed their convictions on one count each of
mail fraud and conspiracy to defraud the government under § 1341.
7. Id. at 2881.
8. Id. at 2877.
9. Id. In effect, the agreeement between Hunt and Wombwell continued the agency relationship. Id.
10. Id. The procedure was for Hunt to consistently direct Insurance Commissioner Harold
McGuffey to award the workmen's compensation policy to Wombwell. Wombwell would then contract with an insurance underwriting agency to write the policy. The underwriting agency sent
commission checks back to Wombwell, which in turn distributed the payments to companies designated by Hunt. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1293 (6th Cir. 1986).
11. McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2877-78.
12. Id.
13. Gray, 790 F.2d at 1293. McNally received the payments through Snodgrass Insurance

Agency. The agency, which also received payments from Wombwell on Hunt's request, served as a
conduit for the $77,500 McNally received. Id.
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The success of the scheme depended on the mails. An insurance underwriting company in Hartford, Connecticut mailed commission checks to

Wombwel's office in Kentucky. 14 Wombwell then distributed the payments.

Seton used commission payments received from Wombwell for such purposes as
purchasing two condominiums and a car which were used personally by Gray
and Hunt. Hunt's son also received a gratuitous payment of $38,500 from
15

Seton.

Hunt was charged with and pleaded guilty to mail and tax fraud. 16 Defendants McNally and Gray were charged with one count of conspiracy and

seven counts of mail fraud, six of which were dismissed. 17 The remaining mail

fraud count was based on the mailing of a commission check from the under-

writing insurance agency to Wombwell. The count charged defendants McNally and Gray with "devis[ing] a scheme (1) to defraud the citizens and

government of Kentucky of their right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly, and (2) to obtain, directly and indirectly, money and other

things of value by means of false pretenses and the concealment of material
facts."' 8 The conspiracy count further alleged that defendants conspired to violate the mail fraud statute. 19 The crux of both counts was that under section
1341 defendants committed a fraud that denied Kentucky citizens certain intan-

gible rights, including "the right to a full and complete disclosure of the practices and procedures employed in awarding the state's workmen's compensation
20

insurance policy."
A jury convicted defendants in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky. 21 The United States Court of Appeals for the
14. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2877.
15. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1293.
16. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2878. Hunt was sentenced to three years imprisonment.
17. Id. The dismissed counts alleged mail fraud in connection with Seton's tax returns. The
indictment, however, failed to allege that the returns were false, so the counts were properly dismissed. Id. at 2878 n.2.
18. Id. at 2878. The offense of mail fraud has two elements, both of which courts have given a
broad reading: (1) the existence of a fraudulent scheme, and (2) a mailing in the course of the
scheme. Survey, supra note 5, at 252-53; see, eg., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399 (1974)
(mailings must be in furtherance of the scheme or artifice to defraud); Pereira v. United States, 347
U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (it is sufficient that the mailing was "incident to an essential part" of the scheme);
United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1914) (the scheme need not contemplate the use of the
mails as an essential element).
19. McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2878. This count also alleged that defendants conspired to defraud
the United States by obstructing the collection of taxes. Id.
20. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1294. This language was not included in the jury
instructions because the district court held such intangible rights implicit in the right to honest
government. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2878 n.3.
21. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879. The district court instructed the jury that a scheme to defraud
under the mail fraud statute could be established on either of two findings:
(1) mIhat Hunt had defacto control over the award of the workmen's compensation insurance contract to Wombwell from 1975 to 1979; that he directed payments of commissions
from this contract to Seton, an entity in which he had ownership interest, without disclosing that interest to persons in state government whose actions or deliberations could have
been affected by the disclosure; ... or (2) that Gray, in either of his appointed positions,
had supervisory authority regarding the Commonwealth's workmen's compensation insurance at a time when Seton received commissions; that Gray had an ownership interest in
Seton and did not disclose that interest to persons in state government whose actions or

1038

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Sixth Circuit affirmed. 22 The court relied on federal cases holding the intangible
rights theory cognizable when a public fiduciary breaches the public trust by
concealing facts so as to benefit personally from offical actions. 23 The court of
appeals held Gray was a public fiduciary, and that because the awarding of the

worker's compensation policy was within the supervisory authority of his official

24
posts, he breached the public trust by failing to disclose his interest in Seton.
The Court upheld McNally's conviction on the theory that despite his nonfiduciary status, his conspiring with a fiduciary to deprive the public of its intangible
25
rights was prosecutable under the mail fraud statute.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 26 The issue posed in
McNally was whether the jury instructions permitted convictions for conduct
outside the reach of section 1341.27 More specifically, McNally challenged the
Court to enunciate the scope of the federal mail fraud statute and to address
whether section 1341 applies to schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible
rights to honest government. The majority opinion, delivered by Justice White,
declined to hold that the mail fraud statute protects the "intangible right of the
citizenry to good government,"' 28 and added that the indefiniteness of the statutory language in section 1341 necessitated the Court's reading. 29 The Court's
opinion concluded with a policy argument: "Rather than construe the statute in
deliberations could have been affected by that disclosure; and that McNally aided and
abetted Gray.
Id. at 2878-79.
22. Gray, 790 F.2d at 1298.
23. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363 (4th Cir. 1979) (public official owes a
fiduciary duty to the public, the breach of which may be fraudulent), aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d
653 (en bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1400 (2d
Cir. 1976) (intangible rights doctrine applies to the situation in which a public official misuses his
public position for private gain); cf United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1026 (8th Cir. 1978)
(misconduct of a public fiduciary in exclusively private matters not involving the misuse of public
office is not an indictable offense under the mail fraud statute), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
24. Gray, 790 F.2d at 1295.
25. Id.; see United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1984) ("There can be no
doubt that a non-fiduciary who schemes with a fiduciary to deprive the victim of intangible rights is
subject to prosecution under the mail fraud statute."); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 122
(2d Cir. 1982) (an individual without formal office may be held to be a public fiduciary if he substantially participates in government operations), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enunciated the following test in Margiotta for imposing
fiduciary status between an "influential political personality" and the public:
Although there is no precise litmus paper test, two time-tested measures of fiduciary status
are helpful: (1) a reliance test, under which one may be a fiduciary when others rely upon
him because of a special relationship in the government, and (2) a de facto control test,
under which a person who in fact makes governmental decisions may be held to be a
governmental fiduciary... These tests recognize the important distinction between party
business and government affairs, permitting a party official to act in accordance with partisan preferences or even whim, up to the point at which he dominates government. Accordingly, the reliance and de facto tests carve out a safe harbor for the party leader who merely
exercises a veto power over decisions affecting his constituency.
Id. at 122.
26. McNally, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
27. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882. For a statement of the district court's instructions to the jury,
see supra note 21.
28. McNally, at 2879.
29. Id. at 2881.
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a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local
and state officials, we read [section] 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of

property rights." 30° The Court then reversed defendants' convictions on the mail
3

fraud count after discussing three concerns. '
First, the Court reviewed the "sparse legislative history" of the statute and
concluded that "the original impetus behind the mail fraud statute" was the

protection of property rights. 32 The Court noted that the statute, as first enacted, was a recodification of postal laws. 33 The Court characterized the statute's "general proscription against using the mails to initiate correspondence in
furtherance 'of any scheme or artifice to defraud' "as a protection of the people
"from schemes to deprive them of their money or property." 34 Subsequent
changes in its wording, the Court suggested, "did not indicate the statute had a
35
more extensive reach."
Second, the Court considered the statutory construction applied to the language in section 1341.

The majority rejected the argument that the two

phrases-"to defraud" and "for obtaining money or property"--are to be read

in the disjunctive.3 6 Even assuming, however, that the statute could be validly

interpreted in either of two ways, the Court wrote that "when there are two
rational readings of a criminal statute," the "harsher" interpretation is not to be
read into the statute absent "clear and definite language" from Congress. 37 The
Court left no doubt about its position on the issue of whether Congress has

provided the requisite definite language. The majority concluded: "If Congress
desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has." 38
Third, the Court expressed concern about setting standards of conduct for
state and local officials. 39 The Court emphasized that defendants Gray and Mc-.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2882.
32. Id. at 2879. For a discussion of the legislative history of the mail fraud statute, see infra
notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
33. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879; see infra note 48.
34. McNally, at 2879 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976)).
35. Id. at 2879-80.
36. Id. at 2880-81. In 1909 the words "or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses" were added after the phrase "any scheme or artifice to defraud," thus codifying the Court's holding in Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896). Act of March 4, 1909, ch.
321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976)). "As we see it," the
majority opinion stated, "adding the second phrase simply made it unmistakable that the statute
reached false promises and misrepresentations as to the future as well as other frauds involving
money or property." McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
37. McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2881; see United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v.
United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S.
218, 221-222 (1952); see also Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926) (criminal conviction
must be predicated on a showing that the offense is "plainly within the statute").
38. McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2881.
39. The Court distinguished between a statute "aimed at protecting the Federal Government
alone" and one designed to protect individual property rights. "[T]he mail fraud statute," the Court
emphasized, "had its origin in the desire to protect individual property rights, and any benefit which
the Government derives from the statute must be limited to the Government's interests as propertyholder." Id. at 2881 n.8. For further discussion of this distinction and its basis, see infra notes 11224 and accompanying text.
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Nally were not charged with defrauding the public of money or property,
preventing the Commonwealth from paying lower premiums or securing better
insurance, receiving the Commonwealth's money by accepting the commissions,
or depriving the Commonwealth of control over its money.4° Absent a finding
of one of these specific charges, the Court stated that "the jury instruction on the
substantive mail fraud count permitted a conviction for conduct not within the
reach of section 1341."41
In his lengthy dissent, Justice Stevens took issue with the Court's rejection
of "an entire doctrine that is both sound and faithful to the intent of Congress." 42 Justice Stevens asserted that a reading of the plain language of the
statute supports a broad purpose inclusive of the "intangible right theory" as
applied to government officials.43 Moreover, he argued that "fraud" definitionally encompasses an intangible right to honest government as well as property
rights, as courts have interpreted the term over many years. 44 Finally, Justice
Stevens wrote, "the series of Court of Appeals' opinions applying this very statute to schemes to defraud a State and its citizens of their intangible right to
honest and faithful government, notwithstanding the absence of evidence of tangible loss, removed any relevant ambiguity in this statute."'45 Justice Stevens
labeled the Court's decision a "crabbed construction" 46 of the mail fraud statute
and added, "[iut is ludicrous to think that a Congress intent on preserving the
integrity of the Postal Service would have used the term 'defraud' in a narrow
sense so as to allow mailings whose purpose was merely to defraud citizens of
'47
rights other than money or property."
Clues about Congress' legislative intent when it adopted the mail fraud statute are sketchy at best. Congress enacted the statute in 1872 as part of a
recodification of the postal laws. 4 8 The statute had "no obvious precursor," nor
did it "[generate] congressional debate or other legislative history explaining its
origins and purposes."' 49 Subsequent amendments did little to clarify the pur-

40. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., joined in all but Part IV by O'Connor, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2886-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2890 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2886-87 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
48. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976)). One commentator suggested the statute was the outgrowth of "two impulses": (1) growth in
the national economy which spawned more fraudulent schemes and the concomitant need for federal
intervention, and (2) "a perception of enlarged and dynamic federal power." See Rakoff, supra note
5, at 780. Another writer noted that the original mail fraud statute contained mail-emphasizing
language to avoid the constitutional challenge of interfering with state powers, rather than to delimit
the type of fraud covered. See W. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLICAL AND ECONOMIC 252-65
(1962).

49. Rakoff, supra note 5, at 779. The majority opinion in McNally noted the sponsor of the
recodification stated the statute was designed "'to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in
the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and
fleecing the innocent people in the country.' McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879 (quoting CONG. GLOBE,
41st Cong, 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth)). The Court concluded this statement
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pose of the statute.5 0 Thus, section 1341 has remained an enigma construed
alternatively by courts as concerned with "the misuse of the mails and with
prosecuting only those schemes that in essential respects [involve] such misuse,"
'51
or "directed at the broadscale prosecution of all kinds of fraud.
The Supreme Court's initial effort to grapple with the scope of the mail
fraud statute was in Durland v. United States.52 In Durland defendant sold
fraudulent investment schemes through the mail to unsuspecting recipients. Defendant contended that the mail fraud statute "reache[d] only such cases as, at
common law, would come within the definition of 'false pretences,' in order to
make out which there must be a misrepresentation as to some existing fact and
not a mere promise as to the future."' 53 The Court held that a scheme to defraud
"includes everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or
present, or suggestions and promises as to the future."' 54 Notably, the Court
' 55
prefaced its holding by commenting, "The statute is broader than is claimed."
The Court read into the statute dual purposes of prohibiting the misuse of the
mails and protecting the public against all fraudulent acts:
[B]eyond the letter of the statute is the evil sought to be remedied,
which is always significant in determining the meaning ....
It was
with the purpose of protecting the public against all such intentional
efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post office from being used to
carry them into effect, that this statute was passed; and it would strip it
of its value to confine it to such cases as disclose an actual misrepresentation as to some existing fact, and to exclude those56in which is only
the allurement of a specious and glittering promise.
Although the Court did not directly address the scope of the mail fraud statute
in Durland,Justice Brewer's opinion nonetheless hinted that the statute's inclusiveness was not to be underestimated. 57 In 1909 the mail fraud statute was
"indicates that the original impetus behind the mail fraud statute was to protect people from
schemes to deprive them of their money or property." Id.
50. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873 (added schemes dealing or pretending to
deal in counterfeit money such as "green cigars" or "green coin"); Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321
§ 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (added "or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises" after "any scheme or artifice to defraud"); Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 645. § 1341, 62 Stat. 763 (removed some language without changing meaning of statute).
For a discussion of the 1909 amendment, see infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. No substantive changes were made in later amendments. See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 34, 63 Stat. 94;
Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 12 (11), 84 Stat. 778; see also Rakoff, supra note 5, at
772 ("[E]ach of the five legislative revisions of the statute has served to enlarge its coverage.").
51. Rakoff, supra note 5, at 786. Rakoff noted several factors affecting courts' broad or strict
constructionist interpretations of the original mail fraud statute: (1) attitudes toward federalism, (2)
judicial philosophies, (3) social and economic biases of judges, and (4) the "degree of moral concern
felt by fjudges] as to the underlying facts of the fraud." Id. at 800; see also Survey, supra note 5, at
239 (early decisions often struggled with and established the constitutionality of the statute).
52. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
53. Id. at 312.
54. Id. at 313.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 313-14.
57. Id. at 313.
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amended to codify the Court's holding in Durland.5 8
The Supreme Court subsequently determined whether the statute as
amended in 1909 was constitutional. In Badders v. United States5 9 defendant,
convicted of placing letters in the mail to further a scheme to defraud, argued
that the mail fraud statute was "beyond the power of Congress as applied to
what may be a mere incident of a fraudulent scheme that itself is outside the
jurisdiction of Congress to deal with." 6 Like the issue posed in Durland, the
question in Baddersprovided the Court with an opportunity to address-at least
implicitly-the scope of section 1341. In upholding defendant's conviction, the
Court maintained that the overt act of putting a letter in the mail is a matter
Congress may regulate. 6 1 In support of its unanimous opinion, the Court cited
the power of Congress to forbid any act in furtherance of a scheme it deems
contrary to public policy, "whether it can forbid the scheme or not."'62 Although
Badders answered the jurisdictional question surrounding federal prosecution of
mail fraud, 63 the decision did little to change the minds of strict or broad constructionists. Whether the opinion "construe[d] the concept of fraud in section
1341 broadly... [or] construed broadly the constitutional power of Congress" is
unclear. 64 Thus, the lower courts were left to decide the scope of the mail fraud
statute.
Given the paucity of Supreme Court decisions bearing on the scope of section 1341, the federal courts of appeals have scrutinized the language in the mail
fraud statute most closely. The question whether section 1341 applies to intangible rights arises most frequently in the context of officials charged with defrauding the public of its right to honest government. Federal courts have, for
the most part, read the statute uniformly and consistently as including schemes
to defraud the public of its right to honest government. 65 In Shushan v. United
States 66 a former member of a parish levy board, a current board member, and
others conspired to receive kickbacks from a bond refunding operation implemented by the board. 67 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected defendants' argument that because the plan was profitable to the
58. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321 § 215, 35 Stat. 1130 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1976)); see supra note 36.
59. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
60. Id. at 393.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The mailing serves as a basis for invoking federal jurisdiction.
64. Intangible-RightsDoctrine, supra note 5, at 580.
65. See United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1984) (sheriff); United States v. Barber,
668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir.) (state commissioner), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982); United States v.
Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (congressman), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980); United States
v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976) (city building commissioner); United States v. Bush, 522
F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975) (city Director of Public Relations), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976);

United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974) (city alderman), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837

(1975).
66. 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1942).
67. Id. at 114-15. The board charged an exorbitant fee to refund outstanding issues of its
bonds. The fees received were put to personal use by the defendants. Id. at 115.
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levy board, the acts were not fraudulent. 68 The court held that defendants owed
a fiduciary duty to the public, which was breached by their bribery of a current

board member and his nondisclosure of his interest in the policy to the remainder of the board. 69 Despite the fact defendants received money from their vic-

tims-the money they pocketed belonged to the taxpayers-the court's language
emphasized the deprivation of the taxpayers' intangible rights to honest govern-

ment: "No trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme
to obtain an advantage by corrupting such an one [sic] must in the federal law be
'70
considered a scheme to defraud."

Not all courts that recognize the intangible rights theory base their decisions on fiduciary duty. In United States v. States7 1 defendants were charged

with falsifying voter registrations and absentee ballots. They were convicted
under section 1341 for "devis[ing] a scheme to defraud the voters and residents
of [specific precincts]."'72 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit rejected defendants' contention that the phrase "any scheme or artifice

to defraud" must be read in conjunction with the words "obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or

promises."' 73 Rather, the court read the statutory language broadly and held
that section 1341 is not limited to schemes to defraud of money or property,

because neither the legislative history nor "the language of the statute on its face
[precludes] a finding that 'a scheme or artifice to defraud' need not concern
74

money or property":
[N]ot only does the appellants' conjunctive construction of the two
phrases place a very strained and limited meaning on the broad wording of the first phrase, but a reading of the statute as a whole reveals

that the two phrases in question are part of an uninterrupted listing of
a series of obviously diverse schemes which result in criminal sanctions
if the mails are used. The more natural construction of the wording in
the statute is to view the two
phrases independently, rather than com75

plementary of one another.

The court also refused to accept defendants' proposition that their conviction
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. In United States v. Rauhoff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit similarly considered the "intangible rights" theory. The issue on
appeal was whether participants in a scheme to bribe the Illinois Secretary of State to obtain a public
contract fell within the scope of the mail fraud statute. The court held that the mailing of "commission checks" from one corporation to another-a means of "laundering the money"-furthered the
scheme and thus was a ground for prosecution under the statute. Id. at 1176. The court also rejected defendant's claim that because everyone involved in the scheme reaped profits, no one was
defrauded. Id. at 1175. "There was a scheme or artifice to defraud," the court found, because the
people were defrauded of "their right to have the business of the Secretary of State conducted free
from bribery, their right to loyal and faithful service of their state officials, and of the right to those
secret profits obtained by ... [the] Secretary of State." Id.
71. 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
72. Id. at 762.
73. Id. at 763-64.
74. Id. at 764 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976)).
75. Id.
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under section 1341 would set a precedent for" 'policing' of state election procedure."' 76 The court pointed to the purpose of the statute-to prevent "misuse of
the Postal Service"-and answered '77that "Congress clearly has the authority to
regulate such misuse of the mails."

In two cases, lower courts turned to a constructive theory of fraud in support of the intangible rights doctrine when "[defendants'] actual enrichment was
not derived directly from anyone ... even arguably defrauded or deceived."' 78
In United States v. IsaaCs7 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upheld convictions of a former Illinois governor and a political ally for
defrauding the citizens of the State of their intangible rights to honest and loyal
service.80 The scheme involved defendants' receipt of bribes in exchange for
their promotion of certain racing interests before the state racing board and state
legislature.81 Several mailings furthered the scheme, but the person from whom
defendants received the bribe was neither deceived nor defrauded. Further, the
citizens of Illinois lost nothing of economic value. In fact, state revenues from
horse-racing increased during the time of the alleged acts.8 2 According to the
court, the citizens nonetheless were deprived of certain "intangible political
rights" that made them victims of any fraudulent scheme under section 1341.83
In United States v. Mandel 84 a former governor of Maryland and codefendants
were convicted of accepting bribes, much like defendants in Isaacs, to promote
special racing legislation pending in the state legislature at that time.85 The race
track investors who bribed the governor certainly were not defrauded; nor did
the public lose anything of economic value. Even so, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that under the intangible rights doctrine
defendants were guilty of depriving Maryland citizens of "the right to conscientious, loyal, faithful, disinterested and honest government through bribery and
non-disclosure and concealment of material information." 86 The court reasoned
that such behavior amounted to a breach of fiduciary trust cognizable under the
intangible rights doctrine and section 1341.87
In April 1987 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
76, Id. at 766.
77. Id. at 766-67. The court cited two cases in support of Congress' broad power to regulate

uses of the Postal Service. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1960) (section 1341
forbids fraudulent use of the mails whether state law forbids it or not); Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391, 393 (1916) ("Whatever the limits to its power, [Congress] may forbid any such acts done in
furtherance of a scheme it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or

not.").
78. Intangible-RightsDoctrine, supra note 5, at 566.
79. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
80. Id. at 1149.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1139.
83. Id. at 1149-50.
84. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), aff'din relevantpart, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
85. Id. at 1364. Mandel received clothing, jewelry for his wife, and some property interests in
return. Id. at 1356-57.
86. Id. at 1359-60.
87. Id. at 1362-64.
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again considered the conviction of a state official for bribery under the mail
fraud statute. In United States v. Holzer"s the court chose to focus on the meaning of the term "fraud." Defendant, a former judge, was convicted of soliciting
"loans" from counsel in cases before him and "not telling the opposing counsel
(let alone the public)." 8 9 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
and stated that "[flraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit... includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation." 90 The court noted that although "the words 'scheme or artifice
to defraud' [do not] reach everything that might strike a court as unethical conduct or sharp dealing," when the evidence strongly suggests an effort to conceal
like that in Holzer, "a defendant's conduct violates an ethical standard well
known to him and to the whole community, and not just something thought up
after the fact by a perhaps overly sensitive federal judge." 91 The court also acknowledged the McNally case pending on a grant of certiorari before the United
States Supreme Court, 92 and responded:
The argument [of defendant in McNally] depends on the view that the
meaning of fraud in the mail-fraud statute was frozen by the conception of fraud held by the framers of the statute when it was first passed
back in the nineteenth century. This seems to us the opposite and
equally untenable extreme from arguing that fraud is whatever strikes
a judge as bad, but in any event the "intangible rights" concept that
the argument attacks is too well established in the courts of appeals for
93
us to disturb.
The Holzer court's response to the issue posed in McNally-that Congress did
intend for section 1341 to reach individuals who did not obtain anything of value
from the victims, including the intangible right to impartial government-set
the stage for the dramatic confrontation between the United States Supreme
Court's reading of the mail fraud statute and the earlier series of courts of appeals decisions to the contrary.
In McNally the Supreme Court relied on the argument rejected in Holzer
and similarly decided cases, and concluded that Congress never intended the
mail fraud statute to reach fraudulent schemes beyond those depriving persons
of property rights. The court opted to read Durlandin its narrowest terms: "As
we see it, adding the second phrase simply made it unmistakable that the statute
reached false promises and misrepresentations as to the future as well as other
frauds involving money or property."' 94 The court further invoked the wellestablished doctrine of lenity to support its reading of the mail fraud statute in
88. 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 307.
90. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on its previous decision in United States v.
Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) (one meaning of fraud in the mail fraud statute is common
law deceit.).
91. Holzer, 816 F.2d at 309.
92. Id. at 310.
93. Id.
94. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
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favor of defendants in McNally. 95 The Court resolved that Congress could

amend the statute to "criminalize using the mails to further a state officer's efforts to profit from governmental decisions he is empowered to make or over

which he has some supervisory authority."'9 6 The Supreme Court thus justified
its choice between the "two rational readings" of the mail fraud statute. 97 The

majority opinion in McNally is not inherently wrong; rather, the issue is whether
the initial wisdom of the Supreme Court and prior decisions inapposite to McNally should be so summarily dismissed.

If the legislative history provides little help in construing section 1341, one
course of analysis is to examine "fraud" in other legal contexts both in the nineteenth century and at present. In his dissenting opinion in McNally, Justice
Stevens argued that "fraud" has been construed broadly in a variety of cases to
encompass intangible rights as well as property rights. 98 The common and statutory law have long "criminalized frauds beyond those involving 'tangible rights,'
"99 and more recently, the prevailing weight of authority has accepted the prem-

ise that fraud in its common-law definition of deceit encompasses the deliberate
act by a political fiduciary of concealing conflicts of interest. 10 Moreover, two
Supreme Court decisions involving another federal statute have been cited by the

lower federal courts as providing support for the intangible rights doctrine. 101
The Supreme Court has considered the meaning of "defraud" under a similarly worded federal statute, the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which proscribed conspiracy by using the identical phrase "to defraud the United
States." 10 2 In Haas v. Henkel 10 3 defendants were charged with conspiracy to
bribe an official in the Bureau of Statistics to issue false reports and provide them

with advance information on market prices of cotton crops. 1

4

The Supreme

95. Id. The Court cited several cases in support of this lenient reading of the statute. E.g.,
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971);
United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952); Fasulo v. United States,
272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926).
96. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882 n.9.
97. Id. at 2881.
98. Id. at 2887 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens noted broad nineteenth-century legal definitions of fraud. E.g., W. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAw 474 (1893); 1 BOUVIER'S LAW DIcTIONARY 873-76 (1897); 1 BURRILL'S LAW DICTIONARY 658-59 (1859); 1 J.STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 186, at 185 (1877).
99. McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2887; see United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979)
(scheme to seduce women prosecutable as wire fraud); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F.
Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1942) (attempt to bribe competitor's employee); Trial of Regina v. Valentine
Jones, 31 How. St. Tr. 251 (1809) (commissary-general of stores made contract conditional on division of profits and was convicted under common law for depriving the public of honest services); see
also Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1896) (Court held the term "fraud" in the mail
fraud statute goes beyond common law definitions).
100. See supra notes 5, 65-70, 74-83 and accompanying text.
101. See Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462
(1910); Act of March 2, 1967, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1983)).
102. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1910). The statute prohibited any conspiracy "to
defraud the United States by depriving it of its lawful right.., of promulgating or diffusing...
information ... officially acquired." 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1983).
103. 216 U.S. 462 (1910).
104. Id. at 478.
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Court considered whether "obstructing and impairing . . . [a] governmental
function" was within the meaning of the statute's language. 10 5 The Court announced that "[the statute's] language is plain and broad." 10 6 The government
rejected the notion that the statute contemplated only a financial loss and concluded that "any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of the Government... would be to
defraud the United States." 10 7 In Hammerschmidt v. United States l0 8 the
Supreme Court ruled that defendants' distribution of circulars discouraging
draft registration was not fraud under the same criminal conspiracy statute it
considered in Haas. The holding, however, was limited to the facts: "[Miere
open defiance of the governmental purpose to enforce [the draft registration]
law" did not amount to fraud.10 9 Although the Hammerschmidtmajority noted
that "to defraud" usually refers to "wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes," 110 the Court added a significant caveat:
To conspire to defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the
Government out of property or money, but it also means to interfere
with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit,
craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. It is not
hecessary that the Government be subjected to property or pecuniary
loss by the fraud, but only that its legitimate official action and purpose
be defeated by misrepresentation, chicane or the overreaching of those
charged with carrying out the governmental intention. 1
Construing the language of section 1341 does not conclusively resolve the
intangible rights debate. States rights have also figured largely in the "mail
fraud issue." In United States v. States 112 the reluctant but concurring Judge
Ross gave additional support for the Supreme Court's "original intent" approach. 113 Although he agreed that defendant's ballot-tampering scheme fell
within the scope of the mail fraud statute, Judge Ross expressed disbelief "that it
was the original intent of Congress that the Federal Government should take
over the prosecution of every state crime involving fraud just because the mails
have been used in furtherance of that crime."'1 14 He noted that States should
have been tried in a state court because election fraud "was purely a state matter." 115 His concern-that States will set a precedent "which will encourage the
same sort of unwarranted federal preemption in the future"' 116 - was apparently
105. Id. at 478-79.
106. Id. at 479.

107. Id. at 479-80.
108. 265 U.S. 182 (1924).
109. Id. at 189. In an effort to distinguish Haas from the facts in Hammerschmidt, the Court
wrote that their discussion in Haas was confined to the issue whether, in cases involving unquestioned deceit or false pretense, the government must suffer financial loss. Id. at 187.
110. Id. at 188.

111. Id. at 188.
112. 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974).
113. Id. at 767 (Ross, J., concurring).
114. Id. (Ross, J., concurring).
115. Id. (Ross, J., concurring).
116. Id. (Ross, J., concurring).
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on the minds of the majority in McNally as well. The McNally majority only
briefly mentioned their reluctance to "[involve] the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state offi-

cials," 117 but the Court returned to this theme in a footnote in which the
majority explained "any benefit which the Government derives from the [mail
fraud] statute must be limited to the Government's interests as propertyholder."11 8 The Court concluded that because the charges against Gray and
McNally did not embody findings that either the Commonwealth was defrauded

of money or property, or that the Commonwealth was deprived of control over
the spending of its money, the limited policing function of the mail fraud statute-the protection of property rights-was not met. 119

Most courts have viewed this issue differently. Some courts have recognized that federal jurisdiction over mail-related offenses does not necessarily interfere with state policing power.1 20 Other courts have observed "the fact that a

scheme may or may not violate State law does not determine whether it is within
the proscriptions of the federal statute."1 2 1 In Badders the United States
Supreme Court stated that the focus of the mail fraud statute was "not the regu-

lation of state affairs," but the misuse of the Postal Service, and regulating the
mails was within the authority of Congress.12 2 Simply put, Congress leaves to
the states the policing of their own laws, but nonetheless reserves the right to
prosecute those who use the Postal Service fraudulently. 12 3 This argument also
117. McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
118. Id. at 2881 n.8. The majority opinion distinguished two kinds of statutes:
"[A] statute which... has for its object the protection of the individual property rights of
the members of the civic body, is one thing; a statute [such as the mail fraud statute] which
has for its object the protection and welfare of the government alone, which exists for the
purpose of administering itself in the interests of the public, [is] quite another."
Id. (quoting Curley v. United States, 130 F. 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1904)).
119. Id. at 2882.
120. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1960); United States v. Classic, 35 F. Supp.
457, 458 (E.D. La. 1940). In another case, United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881 (N.D. 111.1884), the
court rejected defendant's argument that an indictment should be dismissed for failure to establish
an offense for fraud under either common law or state law. The court in Loring held that it was not
necessary that defendant's scheme constitute fraud under common or state law as long as the purpose of the scheme was to defraud and this purpose was effectuated through the mails. Id. at 887.
121. United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972);
accord United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d
641, 646, n.6 (7th Cir. 1975). In Edwards the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
also ruled that defendant's argument that § 1341 violated the tenth amendment was "clearly without
merit." Edwards, 458 F.2d at 883 n.7.
122. Badders, 24 U.S. at 393.
123. The constitutionality of the mail fraud statute and the congressional power it invokes are
firmly rooted in a landmark Supreme Court decision, Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). The
Court in Jackson upheld a "lottery law" passed by Congress to prohibit the mailing of information
concerning illegal lotteries. The opinion contained important language for congressional power to
regulate the mails: "The power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal
system of the country ...[so that Congress may] prescribe regulations as to what shall constitute
mail matter... [so long as Congress] enforc[es] them consistently with rights reserved to the people." Id. at 732. For a discussion of Jackson, see Rakoff, supra note 5, at 787-90.
The holding in Jackson is no less viable in the twentieth century:
[The mail fraud statute and similar statutes] manifest a purpose of Congress to utilize its
powers, particularly over the mails and in interstate commerce, to protect people against
fraud. This governmental power has always been recognized in this country and is firmly
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lends support to the intangible rights doctrine. Because the purpose of section
1341 is "to protect the integrity of the United States mails," courts logically
view the scope of the mail fraud statute expansively with respect to any fraudu124
lent activity perpetrated through the Postal Service.
The effects of eliminating federal jurisdiction over fraudulent mail-related
activities affecting the public's intangible rights to honest government are speculative at best. Most fraud involves the deprivation of money or property and
therefore will still be prosecutable under section 1341 after McNally. However,
McNally grants "an elite class of powerful individuals"-public officials and
other private individuals with supervisory power-virtual immunity under the
mail fraud statute whenever their misuse of the mails cannot be linked to a property loss by the victims. 1 25 Admittedly, inventive counsel will find new ways to
define losses of money and property.12 6 Nonetheless, the McNally decision eliminates the possiblity of raising a meritorious claim on a pure intangible rights
theory under section 1341.
The public will suffer the biggest loss under McNally. The decision undermines the protection of the public from fraudulent acts, particularly in the realm
of political corruption. The consequence will be a greater chance of biased public administrations with minimal accountability to citizens. 127 Ironically, McNally diminishes the protection that Congress earnestly sought to provide by
enacting the mail fraud statute.
established. [These] particular statutes ... have been regularly enforced by the executive
officers and the courts for more than half a century. They are now part and parcel of our
governmental fabric.
Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948).
124. In his dissenting opinion in McNally, Justice Stevens similarly argued, albeit less subtly, for
an expansive view of § 1341:
Once this purpose is considered, it becomes clear that the construction the Court adopts [in
McNally] is senseless. Can it be that Congress sought to purge the mails of schemes to
defraud citizens of money but was willing to tolerate schemes to defraud citizens of their
right to an honest government, or to unbiased public officials? ... Given Congress' "broad
purpose," I "find it difficult to believe, absent some indication in the statute itself or the
legislative history, that Congress would have undercut sharply that purpose by hobbling
federal prosecutors in their effort to combat" use of the mails for fraudulent schemes.
McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S.
642, 655 (1982)).

125. Id. at 2891 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 2890 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For example, kickbacks may fulfill the Court's
money-or-property requirement under an agency theory. If a public official receives a salary for his
services, Justice Stevens suggests that any breach of loyalty would carry with it a property loss to the

employer "who is not getting what he paid for." Id.; see
§ 403 (1958).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

In Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that
property rights included a financial newspaper's confidential information about its publication schedule and contents. Id. at 320. The court maintained that confidential business information's "intangible nature does not make it any less 'property' protected by the mail [fraud statute]," and added
"McNally did not limit the scope of § 1341 to tangible as distinguished from intangible property
rights." Id.
127. See Survey, supra note 5, at 248. This commentator notes, "Even though corruption is...
subtle and difficult to detect ... its damage to the political system . . . may have more serious
consequences than consumer fraud. Unlike ordinary consumer misrepresentation, corruption injures all members of society regardless of direct contact with the offenders." Id.
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Obviously, Congress can amend the mail fraud statute, and Congress
should. If, however, one accepts the proposition that the success of the mail
fraud statute-to encompass an ever-changing variety of fraudulent misuses of
the mails-is its unqualified reference to "any scheme or artifice," then any
amendment that merely lists the acts to which the statute is applicable can only
serve to limit its scope. Thus, Congress should supply language that recaptures
the protections provided by the broad interpretation of section 1341. By stating
that losses other than those that involve money or property are protected by the
statute, the "intangible rights theory" may again be a viable force in federal law
enforcement.
In the absence of explicit legislative comment on its scope, and despite
amendments clarifying its reach, the mail fraud statute unfortunately has borne
the "trappings" of its initial language into the present. This is not the result of
statutory ambiguity, but rather is the product of less-than-careful attention given
by strict constructionists to the new-and-improved language of section 1341.
Durland effectively answered critics of broad construction in 1909. Since then,
United States Courts of Appeals have consistently reiterated the extensive reach
of the statute. Resistance to the statute's broad scope can only be the result of
other motives-fear of federal meddling in states' rights and reluctance to actively pursue white-collar crime. The McNally decision thus becomes a smokescreen for a dramatic message from the United States Supreme Court-a message
that bespeaks a conservative shift toward the protection of the powerful and a
pitiful nod toward the victims of dishonest government. By challenging Congress to "speak more clearly," the McNally Court undoubtedly has taken the
"easy way out." By eliminating an essential source of protection for victims of
fraud, the Court has immunized an entire group of criminals from prosecution.
By relegating legislative and judicial history to a semantic quibble, the Court has
rendered an unwise decision.
DONNA METCALFE DUCEY

